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Judicial Appeal from Decision
of Draft Board
BY ROBERT E. MORE*
The recent verdict of a federal jury in Colorado' finding a member
of Jehovah's Witnesses guilty of violation of the Selective Service Act
2
makes timely a brief review of some of the principles applicable to judi-
cial appeal from a decision of a draft board.
Boeff registered and returned his questionnaire. In his question-
naire he stated, "I am a minister of religion * * *. I have been formally
ordained." He also stated that he was a "conscientious objector" and
filed a regular supporting affidavit in connection with this section of his
questionnaire. The local board found Boeff to be a conscientious ob-
jector and put him in class IV-E. Boeff appealed, claiming that he
should have been put in class IV-D. The regulations provide that "reg-
ular or duly ordained ministers of religion" shall be placed in class IV-D
and that they are "exempt from training and service." The appeal
board affirmed the decision of the local board, and the local board there-
after served notice upon Boeff to report at the federal camp at Colorado
Springs under Amendment No. 72 to the regulations of the Selective
Service Act. This amendment provides that conscientious objectors
shall be placed in class IV-E and shall be "assigned to work of national
importance under civilian direction." Boeff igncred the notice, was
arrested, indicted, and tried. The trial judge permitted defendant to
introduce evidence supporting his claim that he was a "regular and or-
dained minister," and instructed the jury that if they found from the
evidence that defendant was a regular and ordained minister that he
should be acquitted. The jury returned a verdict of guilty.
It will be noticed that in effect defendant was permitted to take a
judicial appeal from the decision of the local board by his plea of not
guilty.
In a recent article upon this question ' it was suggested that "on
*Of the Denver bar; chairman Denver Bar Association committee on national
defense.
'United States v. Irwin Paul Boeff, U. S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Colo., No.
9487.
50 U. S. C. 0301-318.
'Bell, Selective Service and the Courts (1942) 28 A. B. A. J. 164.
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principle, it would seem that the defendant should be permitted to offer
as a defense the same questions that he could prese.nt in a habeas corpus
proceeding, that is, * * * whether there was a fair hearing or whether
the action of the board was arbitrary or unlawful."
Boeff made claim that his board had acted arbitrarily but the oral
instruction of the court (if reported accurately to the writer) went
farther and permitted the jury to review upon its merits the finding of
fact made by the board.
Neither the Selective Service Act of 1940 nor the regulations issued
thereunder expressly provide for judicial review of the acts and decisions
of local boards.4  In addition, the act provides that decisions of local
boards "with respect to inclusion, or exemption or deferment from,
training and service" shall be final except where the regulations issued
by the President authorize an appeal.' The Selective Service Act of 1917
likewise made the decision of the appeal board final. Under both laws,
however, registrants have been permitted relief in the courts under certain
circumstances.6 Of course, the registrant must first exhaust his adminis-
trative remedies.7
In the Boeff case there could be no appeal to the President from the
decision of the appeal board since such appeal may be made on grounds
of dependency only."
It has been suggested that habeas corpus after induction is the only
appropriate court remedy.9
In a recent review of the decisionso it is said:
"The courts state that they will restrict any officer presuming
to act under a statute to the authority given him by that statute,
'Petition of Soberman, 37 F. Supp. 522 (E. D. N. Y. 1941) ; Ex parte Platt,
253 Fed. 413 (E. D. N.Y. 1918).
"50 F. C. A. Appendix 5, §10 (a) (2) (Supp. 1941).
"Application of Greenberg, 39 F. Supp. 13 (D. N. J. 1941); Arbitman v.
Woodside, 258 Fed. 441 (C. C. A. 4th, 1919) ; Ex parte Beck, 245 Fed. 967 (D.
Mont. 1917).
'United States ex rel. Cubyluck v. Bell, 248 Fed. 995 (E. D. N. Y. 1917);
United States ex rel. Ursitti v. Baird, 39 F. Supp. 872 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
'3 Selective Serv. Reg. §28, Par. 379 (1940).
'Dick v. Tevlin, 37 Fed. Supp. 836 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) : Petition of Soberman,
supra note 4; United States ex rel. Filomio v. Powell, 38 Fed. Supp. 183 (D. N. J.
1941).
"Judicial Repiew of Classification under the Selective Service Act (1942) 20 TEX.
L. REV. 371. summarized in 8 CURRENT LEGAL THOUGHT 295.
and will issue a writ of habeas corpus to prevent wrongful deten-
tion by him when he has exceeded his authority. Under this gen-
eral rule, the courts in the conscription cases have limited their deci-
sions to a determination whether there has been a full and fair
hearing accorded the registrant and whether there is evidence to
support the board's decision.""
In the Boeff case the defendant employed a writ of habeas corpus
to challenge the manner in which the local board handled his classifica-
tion. The court dismissed the writ but permitted the jury to pass upon
the chief points raised thereby, as has been stated.
The Greenberg case 2 held that where the evidence showed that
where defendant's wife had no independent income and that defendant's
induction would force her to leave their rented house and return to her
parents that the local board and the board of appeals acted arbitrarily
in putting defendant in class I-A. It is submitted that this decision, too,
amounted virtually to a judicial review of a finding of fact made by the
administrative board. The district court for the eastern district of New
York held that such findings were final and that the courts must accept
the decision of the local board where any evidence to support its finding
was presented to it.'3 Unless defendant has not been afforded a full and
fair hearing or discretion has been abused, courts will not disturb the
board's decision.
14
Certiorari has been held to be an inappropriate remedy to review
the action of draft boards.15
The remedy of injunction has also been refused in cases of this
sort. 16
In Oregon a registrant sought a declaratory judgment freeing him
from duty to register. An injunction restraining prosecution for failure
to register was prayed. The injunction was denied.' 7
"Shimola v. Local Board. 40 F. Supp. 808 (N. D. Ohio 1941) ; United States
ex rel. Errichetti v. Baird. 39 F. Supp. 388 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
'Supra note 6.
'ZUnited States ex rel. Errichetti v. Baird, supra note 11.
"United States ex rel. Broker v. Baird, 39 F. Supp. 392 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
"In re Kitzerow, 252 Fed. 865 (E. D. Wis. 1918); United States ex rel. Roman
v. Rauch, 253 Fed. 814 (S. D. N. Y. 1918) ; Shimola v. Local Board, supra note 11.
'"Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) ; Bonifaci v. Thompson,
252 F. 878 (W. D. Wash. 1917).
"7Stone v. Christensen, 36 F. Supp. 739 (D. Ore. 1940).
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It is believed that in the ordinary case courts will always permit
registrants to show that local boards were biased, prejudiced, acted arbi-
trarily, or that their findings were supported by no competent evidence.
These questions may be presented by a writ of habeas corpus or upon a
plea of not guilty. The registrant should not be allowed to have court
review of a finding of fact made by the local board upon conflicting evi-
dence, however.
The Boeff case, and the numerous cases that will soon be before the
courts involving Jehovah's Witnesses, present complications not present
in the ordinary case. The selective service regulationss define a "regular
minister of religion" as "a man who customarily preaches and teaches the
principles of religion of a recognized church, religious sect, or religious
organization of which he is a member without having been formally
ordained as a minister of religion; and who is recognized by such church,
sect or organization as a minister." The regulations define a "duly
ordained minister" as "a man who has been ordained in accordance with
the ceremonial ritual or discipline of a recognized church * * * to teach
and preach its doctrines and to administer its rites and ceremonies in
public worship; and who customarily performs those duties."
In the Boeff case defendant claimed that he was "ordained by God"
and that he was a "regular minister" who preached from house to house
and person to person.
O~n June 12, 1941, General Hershey classified certain groups of
"ministers" among Jehovah's Witnesses as "regular" practitioners and
vested local boards with wide discretion in individual cases. This will
unquestionably result in diverse rulings on somewhat similar fact situa-
tions by different boards, and will result in a number of court cases.
Depending upon a question of definition, courts may well be somewhat
liberal, as was the court in the Boeff case, in permitting evidence to go
before the jury relative to the nature of the activities of a given defendant
in cases of this sort.
" 10-622.44.
